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Abstract 
The fight against international crimes takes place at many levels, not just before the ad hoc 
tribunals and the International Criminal Court. Nor is the subject limited to the crimes 
prosecuted before those courts. This paper considers how extradition and other forms of 
rendition might be utilized to rid a state of an undesirable alien, particularly one who is 
excluded from refugee status, whether that be to the ICC or, more likely, to another state with 
jurisdiction. However, in undertaking this framework of analysis, the paper also has regard to 
those cases where the undesirability only comes to light through an extradition request 
subsequent to refugee status being granted. In this context, states have three sets of 
obligations that overlap. The Rome statute or extradition treaties require states to surrender 
persons requested by the ICC or other states where the various requirements are met: 
international refugee law and international human rights law require states to protect those 
within their jurisdiction from refoulement; international refugee law also imposes an 
obligation to exclude from the protection that non-refoulement accords, those who are 
deemed unworthy based on criminal activity. The undesirability of the alien is but a side 
factor in balancing these competing claims on the state. 
 
1. Introduction 
Protection should not equate to impunity. Most of the articles arising from this symposium 
are to do with the inability of the state of protection to remove someone who is undesirable, 
usually as a consequence of prior criminal activity, either because of international refugee 
law or guarantees in international human rights law. In this paper, however, the position is 
further complicated by the potential involvement of some third state or even the ICC that may 
want to prosecute the individual and who seeks their surrender from the state of protection. 
To set the scale of the problem in context, the ICTY issued around 160 indictments, the ICTR 
just under 100 and, as of October 2016, the ICC has issued 32. Yet, many more persons have 
committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes against peace/ 
aggression – and the fight against international crime is not confined to those crimes. The UN 
has multifarious, multilateral treaties combatting serious crimes such as hijacking, terrorist 
bombings, the financing of terrorism and hostage taking, to name but a few.1 As will be 
discussed below, from the outset of modern refugee law in 1951, those with respect to whom 
there are serious for considering that they have committed war crimes, crimes against 
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humanity, crimes against peace, serious non-political crimes or are guilty of acts contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations, have been excluded and states have an 
obligation not to protect these applicants for refugee status. Nowadays, they can combat some 
of the potential impunity by transfer to the ICC, but it is more likely that either that state will 
have to assert jurisdiction or rely on that other international obligation, extradition to a state 
with jurisdiction over the international or transnational crime.  
 
As such, this article focuses on the ability of the state of protection to utilize its laws on 
surrender and extradition or other forms of rendition to ensure that, if granted protection with 
the consequence that s/he is rendered prima facie unreturnable, the alleged fugitive 
nevertheless does not escape prosecution. In addition to extradition to a third state, transfer to 
some international court or tribunal may be available or, where the applicant for refugee 
status is excluded, international law may permit the person to be deported to a state where 
jurisdiction to prosecute can be asserted, so-called ‘disguised extradition’. The interplay of 
international refugee law, international human rights law and international criminal law 
render this a complex problem even before one then takes into account the domestic laws, 
procedures and rules of evidence that will also have to be applied. 
 
This article responds to all the different branches of international law that impinge on the 
surrender of an alien who would be at risk in her/ his country of nationality, but whose 
conduct makes them undesirable in the state where they now find themselves. In an age of 
mass movements of peoples, often from conflict zones or fragmented, collapsed, 
dysfunctional states, there is an increasing need to uphold the fundamental guarantee of non-
refoulement, yet ensure non-impunity at the same time, and extradition and other lawful 
means of rendition provide one avenue to secure those twin goals, goals that could never be 
met simply by relying on the International Criminal Court with its very limited jurisdictional 
competence. 
 
2. First Principles 
Before looking at the laws pertaining to extradition and other forms of rendition, it is 
necessary to set out how international refugee law, international human rights law and 
international criminal law interact in various scenarios. 
 
A. Unreturnable and unwanted 
As the media consistently shows, in an ever less welcoming world for displaced persons, 
even the most vulnerable refugees from the most egregious conflicts have their avenues of 
escape closed off. It seems that compassion fatigue, at least amongst the politicians of the 
global north, has rendered nearly every person moving to protect her/himself and their family 
as a potential threat. 
 
The focus of this research symposium is on the undesirable person who cannot be returned to 
her/ his country of nationality or, if stateless, her/ his country of habitual residence. However, 
it may be easier to perceive the state of refuge’s perspective in this context if all non-
returnable persons, no matter what the reason and how valid their claim to protection is, in 
fact, seen as undesirable. There will be many people who are unreturnable of whom the 
undesirable on the basis of prior criminal activities constitute but a small subset. For instance, 
the person who qualifies as a refugee under the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, 1951, or some regional mechanism is unreturnable.2 Alternatively, someone may 
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not qualify as a refugee, but is still unreturnable as a consequence of international human 
rights law or the international law of armed conflict. These persons are unreturnable, but they 
are not so much undesirable as simply unwanted. Of course, this second category also 
incorporates those who have been excluded from refugee status, those who might properly be 
described as undesirable – as is discussed further below, someone might well have a well-
founded fear of persecution for one of the five grounds set out in the aforementioned 1951 
Convention and so would ordinarily qualify as a refugee in international law, but if there are 
serious reasons for considering that they have committed a war crime, crime against peace, 
crime against humanity or serious non-political crime, or that they are guilty of acts contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the UN, then, under Article 1F they are excluded from all 
guarantees in the Convention, although international human rights law still offers a path to 
protection. 
 
The scope of undesirability is broad, and the London Symposium on Undesirable but 
Unreturnable embraced broader understandings, but this paper discusses the extradition of 
refugees as well as rendition or some other form of surrender only in relation to those who 
have been excluded, and will consider whether there might be different responses in relation 
to persons who pose a real threat to the state of protection in comparison to those who are 
merely technically excludable, such as those who could be deemed to have expiated their 
crime.3 
 
B. Removing Protection 
As will be seen, the law relating to extradition and rendition is complicated in its own right 
and that is multiplied if the fugitive qualifies as a refugee or is an asylum-seeker who benefits 
from non-refoulement. Thus, removing such humanitarian protection makes transfer to stand 
trial more viable. This section discusses exclusion under Articles 1F and 33.2 as it 
particularly pertains to extradition or other forms of surrender. 
1. Article 1F(a) and (b) vs. 1F(c) of the 1951 Convention 
Article 1F The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with 
respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: 
(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, 
as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of 
such crimes; 
(b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior 
to his admission to that country as a refugee; 
(c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations.  
The first two subparagraphs of Article 1F refer to there being serious reasons for considering 
that the applicant for refugee status has committed serious crimes, international crimes, even, 
whereas Article 1F(c) refers to her/him being “guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations”. Nevertheless, just because it refers to ‘acts’ does not mean 
that criminality is necessarily irrelevant since the refugee status determination (RSD) process 
must be able to deem the applicant “guilty”. Thus, there could be an interface between Article 
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1F(c) and extradition law. That being said, Article 1F(c) is problematic: it is derived from 
Article 14.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and was originally believed 
to be dealing with human rights violations that did not amount to crimes against humanity, 
although that interpretation is clearly inadequate now.4 Although many states are known to 
use Article 1F(c) only in conjunction with subparagraphs (a) and (b), the UK Supreme Court 
applied it in the case of Al-Sirri and DD v SSHD5 so as to exclude a person who mounted an 
armed insurrection against a Security Council mandated intervention force in Afghanistan, 
ISAF, without making clear that war crimes contrary to Article 1F(a) were a necessary 
component of the decision; it was enough that ISAF was mandated to maintain international 
peace and security. The link between Article 1F(c) acts and extraditable crimes may not 
always be straightforward, although prosecution before the International Criminal Court may 
be possible.6 
2. Article 33.2 (both limbs) 
Article 33.2 allows for non-refoulement protection to be withdrawn from an Article 1A.2 
refugee if there are reasonable grounds for regarding her/him 
… as a danger to the security of the country in which s/he is, or who, having 
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes 
a danger to the community of that country. 
The first limb, dealing with “danger to the security of the country”, is sufficiently wide to 
allow the non-refoulement protection in Article 33.1 to be disapplied based on criminality 
abroad post-refugee status, with extradition available as a means by which to ensure 
prosecution, but the criminality must pose a danger to the security of the protecting state. 
Given that Article 32 deals with expulsion on grounds of national security or public order and 
there is no loss of the guarantees provided by Article 33.1, then the “danger to the security of 
the country” in Article 33.2 must be extremely serious if there is to be an interference in the 
fundamental humanitarian protection offered by non-refoulement. As for the second limb, 
particularly serious crime, the refugee needs to have been convicted by a final judgment, 
which suggests jurisdiction would have to exist in the protecting state, although the crime 
may have occurred outside and either universal or representative jurisdiction has been 
asserted. 
3. Paragraph 7 of the 1950 Statute 
Subparagraph (d) is worded completely differently from Article 1F. UNHCR’s own 
documentation states, however, that since Article 1F is subsequent to the 1950 Statute, the 
organisation should use that definition of exclusion.7 
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4. Participation8 
Article 1F refers to there being serious reasons for considering that the person seeking 
refugee status as having ‘committed’ the relevant crime or being guilty of the act. There is 
not space here to delve into the intricacies of participation for criminal prosecution (to which 
extradition or surrender lead and, as a consequence, with respect to which the requirement of 
double criminality would present further problems), whether that be before some 
international court or tribunal or at a domestic trial.9 The question is whether there ought to 
be a separate test for participation for the purposes of excluding someone.10 Does 
participation in that context require an autonomous, narrower meaning separate from that 
used in criminal proceedings because Article 1F is a limitation on a humanitarian provision, 
non-refoulement, that is customary international law?11 
 
C. Extraditable ≠Excludable and vice versa? 
Unlike Paragraph 7(d) of the 1950 Statute, Article 1F makes no reference to extradition, 
although Article 1F(b) clearly draws on an extradition law concept, the political offence 
exemption.12 In terms of distinctions between the two regimes, extradition law and refugee 
law, at its most basic level it has to be a serious non-political crime to fall within Article 
1F(b). However, what are the criteria by which to determine seriousness? The potential 
sentence for the extradition crime, the threat to the protecting state à la Article 33.2, 
something that renders the non-political crime one equivalent to the crimes listed in Article 
1F(a) such that 1F is consistent, or serious vis-à-vis the victim? And is it arguable that the 
degree of seriousness should be taken into account at some stage in the exclusion process, for 
it needs to be borne in mind that even where courts determine a fugitive to be extraditable 
because the offence is not of a political character, the government of the requested state 
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retains a residual discretion to refuse extradition - should that be factored in via the criterion 
of seriousness in Article 1F(b)? 
 
In addition, there are also different evidentiary requirements between extradition hearings and 
a determination that an applicant should be excluded from refugee status. Some extradition 
hearings only require evidence relating to the alleged participation by the fugitive, others a 
prima facie case, while Article 1F looks for “serious reasons for considering that” and Article 
33.2, “reasonable grounds”. There may be different rules as to the admissibility of evidence 
in each type of hearing. More significantly, the two types of hearing, extradition and RSD, 
should not be fused: the former cannot deal with all the matters essential to deciding that 
someone who would otherwise qualify as a refugee should lose that protection of her/his 
fundamental right not to be returned to the frontiers of a territory where her/ his life or 
freedom would be threatened. Fewer problems should arise, though, where an extradition 
hearing has already decided that the requested crimes were non-political in character - only 
the strongest evidence that was not admissible at the extradition hearing but which can be 
presented in a refugee status determination hearing should reverse that finding for the 
purposes of Article 1F(b).13 Otherwise, extradition and RSD are such different processes that 
one cannot superimpose one on to the other.14 
 
D. Exclusion and international human rights law/ Customary non-refoulement in 
international law 
Exclusion from refugee status does not remove the protections that international human rights 
law provides. Such guarantees are easy to apply where there is an individualized risk of 
irreparable harm following return.15 In the very recent Rwanda Five case,16 the requested 
persons failed to show that conditions in Rwandan prisons were so bad that they amounted to 
inhuman or degrading treatment nor that there was a real risk they faced torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment of punishment. On the other hand, the court refused extradition because 
of issues surrounding the fairness of the trial the Rwanda Five would face in Kigali. 
631. I find that if extradited, as things presently stand, the defendants would be 
denied the effective representation of counsel in cases which so obviously call for 
effective and skilled representation by suitably experienced and re-sourced 
defence lawyers. It is too early to say that sufficient funding for defence 
investigations in relation to witnesses abroad will be provided. These defendants 
are legally aided in this country and will be indigent in Rwanda. I have seen in 
this case what the effective representation by counsel can achieve. Without such 
representation and funding, the High Court in Rwanda would be presented with 
the prosecution case and the [requested persons] would find it impossible to 
present their side of what happened. I find the [requested persons] would be ex-
posed to a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice and a breach of Article 6. 
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More interesting, though, from the perspective of the non-returnability of undesirable persons 
is the decision in NA v United Kingdom,17 where the Fourth Section of the European Court of 
Human Rights held that a general situation of violence might expose the claimant to a real 
risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, more especially so if s/he is a member of a 
persecuted section of society. The Rwanda Five case is of a very particularized risk to these 
individuals, but NA prevents return of anyone because of a general situation in the requesting 
state. Both sorts of non-returnability might apply with respect to the extradition of 
undesirable persons in need of protection. 
 
Whilst referring to international human rights law in this context, the applicant’s right to 
confidentiality, especially as regards the country of nationality, must be preserved at all times 
for her/his safety and in relation to their associates still in that state. Thus, the process of 
obtaining evidence regarding the person’s potential exclusion for the RSD hearing should not 
increase the threat they might face.18 Moreover, nothing in the extradition hearing, where the 
country of nationality may be the requesting state, should reveal the fact the applicant is 
applying for refugee status or that s/he may be excluded therefrom. Where the government of 
the state of protection carries its own RSD, then evidence during that process might alert it to 
the possibility that the asylum-seeker has committed extradition crimes prior to her/ his 
application. As indicated, it is contrary to international human rights law guarantees 
regarding fairness of trial that evidence that emerges during refugee status determination, 
where the burden will be on the applicant to disclose information so as to prove her/ his well-
founded fear of persecution, should be passed on to the country of nationality or any other 
country that might be able to prosecute so as to instigate an extradition request.19 The only 
deviation from this stance might arise where the crimes disclosed are ones of universal 
jurisdiction and in those cases the state of protection will be under a treaty or customary 
obligation to prosecute or even surrender to some international tribunal. Where status 
determination is carried out by UNHCR on behalf of the state, the obligation not to disclose 
is stronger even though it has not ratified any international human rights law treaties.20 
UNHCR has a duty of international protection to all refugees and, at the time of disclosure by 
the asylum-seeker, s/he will have been treated as a refugee because status had not been 
determined up to that point. Equally, UNHCR needs to be seen by those seeking refugee 
status as not just an arm of the state if persons are to feel secure in approaching the 
organisation. Finally, status is determined by UNHCR’s own staff and their personal security, 
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given the organization does not have its own police force or prison system unlike states, 
depends on confidentiality and non-disclosure, a true separation, vis-a-vis the state, especially 
in cases of exclusion: if it were ever to reveal information gleaned from status determination, 
then it compromises for all time its status as an international organisation with immunity - 
UNHCR is never to be seen as some private investigator for the state. As regards disclosure 
of crimes that would fall within the competence of the ICC, simply to guarantee accessibility 
to displaced persons in need of protection and the primacy of the protection of refugees, 
UNHCR should have the same status as the ICRC in these circumstances.21 
 
*** 
 
Therefore, on the basis of the above, it is now possible to have regard to the role, if any, of 
extradition law in dealing with the undesirable but unreturnable alien. 
 
3. Substantive Issues 
 
A. Extradition Requests and Exclusion from Refugee Status 
This topic may seem to contradict to two of the first principles described above: that 
extraditable does not equal excludable and that international human rights law requires 
confidentiality as between the hearings on RSD and extradition. To deal with the latter first, it 
does not apply vice versa - information that comes to light in the extradition hearing that is 
admissible in the RSD hearing can and should be available so that any decision to exclude is 
based on the most complete picture. 
 
The former principle, that extraditability does not automatically entail that the person is 
excludable, is more complicated. The existence of an extradition request must put the 
adjudicators on notice that the applicant for refugee status might need to be investigated vis-
à-vis Article 1F, much more so if it is a request to surrender issued by the International 
Criminal Court: under Article 58 of the Rome Statute,22 warrants are only issued by the Pre-
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Trial Chamber once the Office of the Prosecutor provides “(d) [a] summary of the evidence 
and any other information which establish reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
committed those crimes”. However, on its own, even an ICC indictment or arrest warrant 
cannot lead to automatic exclusion. “Serious reasons” is a higher standard of proof than 
“reasonable grounds for suspecting” or “mere suspicion”.23 All that being said, if the 
extradition request is for someone to serve out a sentence post-conviction in the requesting 
state, that might be a serious reason for considering that s/he should be excluded for an 
Article 1F crime, but that is because there has been a conviction and even that would have to 
be reviewed to ensure it had not been imposed as a form of persecution. 
 
B. Article 1A.2 is no bar to extradition, if safe 
When would extradition of a refugee or asylum-seeker be safe? If the fugitive is a refugee 
and the request is from her/his country of nationality, the obligation in Article 33.1 to respect 
non-refoulement will render surrender impossible. Even if the fugitive is still only applying 
for refugee status, given that status is declaratory in character, only once the RSD process is 
complete could a proper decision be taken as regards surrender to the country of nationality. 
If the request is made by a third state, though, the dangers are reduced, but the requested 
state, the protecting state, still has to be satisfied that extradition will not make the fugitive 
less protected against refoulement whether s/he be a refugee or an asylum-seeker. Transfer to 
the ICC would present the fewest problems, but only given that one can rely on The 
Netherlands offering protection on an acquittal and that the ICC itself will choose a place for 
incarceration if the refugee is convicted that did not risk refoulement on release. In practice, 
one could imagine that an extradition request for someone accused of bank robbery, a serious 
non-political crime in most cases,24 will be more readily granted than one that falls within 
Article 1F(a) or where the political motivation for, but not the political character of, the crime 
is more prominent, such as disproportionate acts of terrorism. One can imagine the requesting 
state acting solely to prosecute the common elements of the crime if it were bank robbery, 
whereas war crimes, crimes against humanity and some types of serious non-political crime 
would more readily raise concerns about the potential lack of impartiality. 
 
Of course, an extradition request may alert the state to crimes that, once dealt with as part of 
the RSD process, would exclude the refugee25 or asylum-seeker. Then international human 
rights law needs to be taken into account.26 Even if international human rights law would not 
prevent extradition, there are still a plethora of remedies available in extradition law that 
could protect an excluded refugee. There is no possibility to accord them a complete analysis 
in this limited space,27 but these additional forms of protection complement those available 
under international refugee law and international human rights law and call into doubt the 
propriety of simply deporting someone excluded: 
1. Non-extradition of nationals 
                                                                                                                                                       
to believe that the person committed those crimes; and 
(e) The reason why the Prosecutor believes that the arrest of the person is necessary. 
(Emphasis added). 
23JS (Sri Lanka), above note 10, at paragraph 39. More jurisprudence from the ICC on the issuance of 
arrest warrants is needed before one can be categorical in these matters. 
24Cf. In re Ezeta, 62 F.972 (1894) N.D. Cal. Quinn v Wren, [1985] ILRM 410. Quinn had been carrying 
out frauds in order to raise funds to purchase arms for the Irish National Liberation Army – a délit connexe. 
25Article 1F(a) or (c). 
26See cases cited above, note 15, and Agiza v Sweden, Communication No. 233/2003, UN Doc. 
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, 20 May 2005. 
27See Gilbert, above note 12, chapters 4 and 5. 
  
This might seem completely inappropriate in the context of an application for refugee status, 
but some states, including The Netherlands, have held that refugees have the same rights as 
nationals in this regard and when ratifying the 1957 European Convention on Extradition the 
Nordic states made declarations that protect domiciled aliens.28 However, France, Germany 
and Switzerland do not treat refugees as nationals.29 
2. The Political Offence Exemption 
This is possibly the most complex element of extradition law and there is no one accepted 
understanding of the exemption for political offences.30 For certain, a political motive is a 
necessary but insufficient element. The approach of courts in the United States has been to 
look for a political uprising and then any offence that is part of or incidental to that uprising is 
one of a political character,31 no matter how disproportionate.32 The European approach to 
the political offence exemption looks only for a political disturbance rather than an uprising,33 
but the crime must be proximate to the ultimate goal of the fugitive’s organisation34 and 
proportionate.35 While the exemption cannot, by definition, protect someone excluded under 
Article 1F(b) and is extremely unlikely to protect in a 1F(a) case,36 it might be of relevance in 
relation to acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and it 
complements the political opinion ground set out in Article 1A.2 of the 1951 Convention. 
Equally, where the request is for a common crime, but that request is politically motivated, 
then there is a direct overlap with persecutory prosecutions.37 
3. Non-Discrimination 
Related to the political offence exemption is the non-discrimination clause. Akin to Article 
1A.2's grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, it prevents extradition if the 
fugitive would be prosecuted or punished on those grounds - in many ways the direct 
correlative protection to the 1951 Convention’s exclusion clause, although it does not usually 
include discrimination on grounds of membership of a particular social group. That it is even 
incorporated into most of the UN’s anti-terrorism conventions38 throws into even greater 
contrast the fact that outside RSD carried out by UNHCR, the RSD process undertaken by 
                                                 
28See MY v Public Prosecutor, 100 ILR 401 and KM v The Netherlands, 100 ILR 430. See ETS 24. 
29See B. Karle, ‘Some Problems Concerning the Application of the European Convention on 
Extradition, in Council of Europe, Legal Aspects of Extradition at pp. 49 et seq. (1970); and T v Swiss Federal 
Prosecutor’s Office, 72 ILR 632 at 635-36 (1966). 
30See Chapter 5 of Gilbert, above note 12. This section will not deal with pure political offences, such 
as lèse majesté, although UNHCR has recently issued a Guidance Note to deal with that crime - Guidance Note 
on Refugee Claims Relating to Crimes of Lèse Majesté and Similar Criminal Offences, September 2015, pp.11-
12, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/55ee8a254.html [accessed 25 January 2016]. 
31See In re Ezeta, above note 24; Quinn v Robinson 783 F.2d 504 (1981); cf. Extradition of Atta, 
Ahmed v Wigen 910 F.2d 1063 at 1066 (1990).  
32The Artukovic cases 140 F.Supp 245 (1956); 247 F.2d 198 (1957); 355 US 393 (1958); 170 F.Supp 
383 (1959). Cf. 784 F.2d 1354 (1986). 
33In re Castioni [1891] 1 QB 149. 
34Cheng v Governor of Pentonville Prison [1973] AC 931 at 945; In re Nappi 19 ILR 375 at 376 (Swiss 
Federal Tribunal, 1952). 
35In re Pavan [1927-28] Ann.Dig. 347 at 349 (Swiss Federal Tribunal); Watin v Ministère Public 
Fédéral 72 ILR 614 at 617 (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 1964); T, above note 13; McGlinchey v Wren [1982] IR 154 
at 159. 
36It is hard to imagine when such crimes would be proportionate and genocide is expressly deemed 
non-political in Article VII of the Genocide Convention 1948, 78 UNTS 277. 
37See R v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Kolczynski [1955] 1 QB 540; see also, In re Kavic, 
Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic 19 ILR.371 (Swiss Federal Tribunal). 
38See G. Gilbert and AM. Rüsch, ‘Jurisdictional Competence Through Protection: To What Extent Can 
States Prosecute the Prior Crimes of Those to Whom They Have Extended Refuge?’ 12 JICJ 1093 at 1106-08 
(2014). 
  
states does not allow for a proportionality test.39 
4. Double criminality 
Even if excluded, but particularly so if excluded under Article 1F(c), the extradition request 
must still be for a crime that is recognised as such in both the requesting state and requested 
state. There may well be further requirements as to the minimum potential sentence a fugitive 
would face. Double criminality is not difficult to show where a crime has been committed in 
person by the refugee or asylum-seeker in the requesting state - most states could prosecute in 
such circumstances, especially for the sorts of crimes set out in Article 1F.40 As indicated 
above, the double criminality requirement adds a significant degree of complexity where the 
applicant for refugee status did not directly participate directly in the actual crime because of 
the scope of joint criminal enterprise in international and domestic law and as regards aiding 
and abetting.41 Given that Article 1F is a limitation on a humanitarian provision and should 
therefore be interpreted restrictively, the understanding of having committed one of the 
crimes may be narrower than how that has been interpreted in the ad hoc tribunals and ICC. 
5. Death penalty 
Many extradition treaties allow the requested state to refuse extradition if the person might 
face the death penalty in the requesting state, but would not in the requested state. Moreover, 
international human rights treaty bodies have held that an abolitionist state cannot surrender 
to a state that retains capital punishment without obtaining a guarantee that it will not be 
carried out on the fugitive.42 This guarantee would apply as much to an excluded person as 
any other alleged fugitive. 
6. Specialty 
Finally, extradition contains the so-called specialty principle. At its simplest, this requirement 
entails that a fugitive can only be dealt with for the crimes in the extradition request, so no 
persecution may be perpetrated through filing subsequent additional charges following 
surrender. However, it also means that ordinarily a fugitive cannot be transferred by the 
requesting state to a third state, even after any sentence has been served, without the consent 
of the state of protection, thus rendering chain refoulement via the extradition process 
contrary to inter-state obligations in the extradition treaty. 
 
The above is a limited review of how extradition law may provide an alternative series of 
guarantees for the applicant for refugee status, even if s/he is excluded and international 
human rights law provides no complementary protection.43 
 
C. Post-status criminality and Article 1F(a) and (c) 
UNHCR’s 2003 Guidelines on Exclusion44 set out that 1F(a) crimes and 1F(c) acts can be 
used to revoke refugee status, so in this case the extradition request could be made with 
                                                 
39See, for example, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 9 November 2010 (reference for a 
preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht - Germany) - Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B (C-
57/09), D (C-101/09), paragraph 3 of the operative part of the judgment. Cf. G. Gilbert, ‘Current Issues in the 
Application of the Exclusion Clauses’ in Feller, Türk and Nicholson, above, note 11, pp.425-78 and 2003 
Background Note at paragraph 76, especially the Swiss cases cited in footnote 71 - above, note 4. 
40Cf. France’s Cour de Cassation has overturned the extradition of three persons to Rwanda for 
genocide because genocide was only criminalised by Kigali in 1996 and 2004, after the genocide - see BBC 
News website, 26356286.stm, 26 February 2014. Rwandan General Karake, arrested in the United Kingdom on 
a Spanish European Arrest warrant on war crimes charges, could not be surrendered because, unlike Spain, the 
United Kingdom cannot prosecute war crimes occurring outside its territory except in the case of grave breaches 
- BBC News website 33846457.stm, 10 August 2015. 
41
 See above, §2B.4. 
42See Judge and Soering, above note 15. 
43See below, note 46. 
44Above, note 4, at paragraph 6. 
  
respect to a recognised refugee who travelled abroad to commit a crime and that would 
permit the state of protection, the requested state, to exclude her/ him from the protections of 
the 1951 Convention, although that would have to be determined in a separate proceeding 
from the extradition hearing. International human rights law would still apply once 
revocation occurs, but it is possible that an extradition request would not result, in and of 
itself, in revocation under Article 1F(a) or (c). It is also very likely that if the request is for an 
Article 1F(a) crime, then the protecting state will have jurisdiction to prosecute and convict; 
once convicted of a particularly serious crime, then Article 33.2 could be applied, too. 
 
D. Diplomatic Assurances45 
Diplomatic assurances are sought in extradition cases as much as exclusion cases as a way of 
allowing the protecting state to rid itself of the fugitive. In the same way, however, their 
reliability is discounted by UNHCR and human rights treaty bodies in relation to states where 
the use of torture and ill-treatment is endemic.46 As a solution to the issue of undesirable 
aliens who are, nevertheless, unreturnable, it is extremely limited and cannot be treated as the 
default by states trying to counter impunity whilst upholding human rights. 
 
E. Disguised Extradition post-Exclusion 
Subject to international human rights law concerns, an excluded person can be deported to 
their country of nationality. However, if deportation is being used to avoid the protections 
offered by extradition law where extradition arrangements exist between the country of 
nationality and the state where the person sought refugee status, then that might be deemed to 
be an ultra vires exercise of power by the relevant minister.47 Nevertheless, the fact that the 
accused will be prosecuted on deportation is not sufficient on its own to deem the order 
invalid - there has to be a conscious attempt to disregard the proper extradition procedures. 
Although each case would have to be examined on its own facts, that disguised extradition is 
being utilised where an extradition treaty exists calls into question whether s/he is being 
afforded protection in line with international refugee law and international human rights law - 
disregard of the proper processes of extradition law raises concerns about whether fair trial 
will be guaranteed. 
 
F. Aut dedere, Aut judicare 
The principle of aut dedere, aut judicare, extradite or prosecute, is not customary 
                                                 
45See the paper ‘Deporting Undesirable Migrants: Diplomatic Assurances and the Challenge 
of Human Rights’ by Mariagiulia Giuffré, delivered at the 2016 London conference. 
46See UNHCR Guidance Note, above note 7, at paragraphs 25 and 27-30; Agiza, above note 26, and 
Saadi v Italy Application no. 37201/06, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber) 28 February 2008. 
See also, Rrapo v Albania, Application no. 58555/10, European Court of Human Rights (4th Section), 25 
September 2012, at paragraphs 69-74, a case concerning a request from the United States: 
72. The Court recognises that, in extradition matters, diplomatic notes are a standard means 
for the requesting State to provide any assurances which the requested State considers 
necessary for its consent to extradition. It also recognises that, in international relations, 
diplomatic notes carry a presumption of good faith. The Court considers that, in extradition 
cases, it is appropriate that that presumption be applied to a requesting State which has a long 
history of respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and which has 
longstanding extradition arrangements with Contracting States …. 
See also, House of Lords Select Committee on Extradition Law, 2nd Report of Session 2014-15, paragraphs 78 
et seq., especially the recommendations at paragraphs 88-94. 
47Compare and contrast R v Brixton Prison (Governor), ex parte Soblen [1962] 3 All ER 641 with 
Schlieske v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 84 ALR 719 (1988) and Bennett v 
Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court [1994] 1 AC 42. 
  
international law.48 It is often established in treaties providing for extradition as a means of 
combatting serious international crimes. Where the state where the person is found does not 
extradite, it is obliged to prosecute. However, if the state that excludes does not prosecute the 
Article 1F crime and cannot return them to the locus delicti, are there any circumstances in 
which third states have an obligation/ right to seek extradition in order that the person might 
not escape punishment? It is arguable that if the crime is genocide for the purposes of the 
1948 Convention,49 then all states parties are required under Article 1 “to prevent and punish” 
it. A similar obligation might be imposed as regards grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol 1, 1977, where the treaties require aut judicare, 
aut dedere.50 It may even be said that the same ought to apply in cases of torture.51 On the 
whole, however, relying on aut dedere, aut judicare in its current state of development will 
provide an inadequate response, apart from in a limited number situations, to ensuring that 
those excluded but who are unreturnable do not escape punishment. A more generic response 
by states asserting domestic jurisdiction to prosecute whenever protection is afforded, either 
under international refugee law or international human rights law, may be the only effective 
answer to the present situation of impunity, no matter how limited the success has been so far 
- diplomatic assurances are ineffective and the state of limbo for the failed applicant for 
refugee status is unacceptable. Extradition may play a part in that response, too, but trial in 
the protecting state needs to be re-considered and legislated for more fully and widely.52 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
International criminal is part of the fight against impunity. The ICC forms part of a network 
designed to ensure that the most egregious criminals do not escape punishment. Equally, 
however, other branches of international law provide guarantees of protection to those who 
have committed some of the worst crimes. Transferring anyone who has sought refugee status 
to another state, whether their application was successful or not, raises a plethora of issues 
beyond those that ordinarily beset extradition law. Whenever one is dealing with someone 
who is unreturnable, transferring them to any other state or even the ICC raises issues about 
how far the guarantee of non-refoulement will be respected in the requesting state or, in the 
case of international courts and tribunals, the state where the convicted person serves her/his 
sentence: extradition also entails that the requested state is prepared to re-admit the refugee 
after s/he has served any punishment in the requesting state, even though s/he now has a 
conviction. It may even be that once re-admitted, the refugee may lose her/ his status through 
the application of Article 1F(a) or (c) or, if s/he now poses a threat to the community of the 
protecting state, that the second limb of Article 33.2 might apply because they might have 
been convicted in the requesting state of a particularly serious crime. Nevertheless, 
international human rights law may still render them unreturnable. 
                                                 
48See the Final Report of the Working Group on the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (aut dedere, 
aut judicare), UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.844, 5 June 2014. See also the Fourth Report on the Obligation to Extradite or 
Prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare) of the then Special Rapporteur, Zdzislaw Galicki, UN Doc. A/CN.4/648, 31 
May 2011. See also, M.C. Bassiouni and E. Wise, Aut Dedere, Aut Judicare: the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute 
in International Law, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995). See generally, Gilbert and Rüsch, above note 38, at pp.1105-10. 
49Above note 3635. 
5075 UNTS 31-417 and 1125 UNTS 3-608. 
51See R v Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet; R v 
Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet (On 
Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division) [1999] 2 WLR 827; Questions Relating to the 
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), ICJ Judgment of 20 July 2012. 
52Gilbert and Rüsch, above note 38, for a comprehensive review of ensuring that there is no impunity 
gap through protection of the individual. 
  
 
That extradition and surrender are part of the response to dealing with undesirable yet 
unreturnable aliens cannot be gainsaid, but they offer no comprehensive solution to this 
situation. States cannot try and pass on their responsibility to prevent impunity in the face of 
serious reasons for considering that the applicant for refugee status has committed an Article 
1F crime or act to other states, whether that be through a fruitless search for diplomatic 
assurances, rendition or the “long dark night of limbo” that the failed refugee presently faces. 
As has been shown, those who have been accorded refugee status under the 1951 Convention 
may well be extraditable, but extradition cannot provide a means to avoid the customary 
obligation not to refoule, even where the person in question has been excluded under Article 
1F if s/he must still be protected under international human rights law. States need to develop 
means by which to prosecute the very serious crimes set out in Article 1F in places other than 
the country of nationality and, while the ICC, is part of that response, it will never be a 
comprehensive solution to undesirable but unreturnable aliens. 
